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a b s t r a c t
24Airport pricing is a central issue in international transport policies, which tend to support
25pricing schemes based on marginal operating costs. This paper aims to provide empirical
26evidence in support of increased differentiation in airport charges on the basis of marginal
27passenger costs being sensitive to the type of airline, i.e. full-service, low-cost, and charter.
28To that end, both long- and short-run multi-output cost functions are estimated over an
29unbalanced pool database of 29 UK airports observed between 1995 and 2009. The passen-
30ger output is hedonically-adjusted in order to introduce the desired level of disaggregation
31while also keeping a parsimonious speciﬁcation. Results show that low-cost passengers
32impose signiﬁcantly lower costs to airport infrastructure than those from either full-service
33or charter airlines. A full schedule of marginal and average incremental cost estimates for
34the combined passenger categories is provided for all sample airports. Taking into account
35the existence of returns to scale and economies of capacity, this provides a useful guide for
36optimal pricing of aeronautical infrastructure under either single- or dual-till regulations.
37 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
38
39
40 1. Introduction
41 Airport pricing is a central issue in international transport policies (e.g. EC, 2001), which tend to support ﬁrst-best pricing
42 schemes based on marginal costs (MC) where the user pays exactly for the resources employed. According to the economic
43 theory, MC prices would lead to optimal usage of airport infrastructure as well as to valid investment signals in the long run.
44 These beneﬁts, however, while being sought after by governments and regulators on the grounds of public welfare, do not
45 tend to ﬁnd much support from other industry agents. Airlines, for example, typically ask for lower, subsidized charges (e.g.
46 landing, security, handling, etc.) arguing that they indirectly generate business for the airport in terms of non-aeronautical
47 revenues (e.g. parking, retail, catering, etc.). Airports, especially those privatized, are also wary of MC pricing, since it does
48 not lead to cost recovery of aeronautical infrastructure under the likely existence of returns to scale. These opposing views
49 have led to a highly regulated environment. Thus, it is not uncommon that aeronautical charges for major airports are subject
50 to the oversight of a public regulator, who needs to balance the public interest with the need for proﬁtability or self-sustain-
51 ability of a (possibly) corporatized operator. This fact, in combination with the increased importance of non-aviation activ-
52 ities in the airport business, has led to the adoption of two main price regulation approaches: (i) single-till, where prices are
53 set to cover total costs and cross-subsidization between aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities is possible, and (ii)
54 dual-till, where prices are related to speciﬁc costs without cross-subsidization (Lu and Pagliari, 2004). An additional distinc-
55 tion can be made by considering the long- or short-run nature of the regulatory cost base, which, will roughly depend on the
56 level of congestion and the need to generate income to fund a capacity expansion (CAA, 2001a).
0965-8564/$ - see front matter  2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2013.08.002
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 6 18 326 107.
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57 If the airport’s aeronautical cost structures do not allow for MC pricing without incurring in losses, the operator may seek
58 to charge second-best break-even prices. Under such circumstances, economic theory suggests that Ramsey prices1 are the
59 preferred option in terms of social welfare (See e.g. Morrison, 1982). In practice, however, average cost pricing has been the
60 preferred pricing method in the airport industry during the last decades (Rendeiro, 1997). In a multi-output environment, this
61 translates into average incremental costs (AIC) being used as benchmarks for second-best ‘‘subsidy-free’’ prices (Graniere,
62 1996).
63 All these economic principles are observed, to a great degree, in the price regulation process of several major airports by
64 the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). In these cases, airport-speciﬁc price caps per passenger are typically set for a ﬁve-
65 year period and then reviewed after a public consultation (See, e.g. UK CAA, 2007). These single-till price caps, and more spe-
66 ciﬁcally, their annual rate of change (RPI-X),2 are set to incentivize capital investment and increase productivity. To that end,
67 CAA calculations are largely cost-related, implicitly drawing on familiar concepts such as MC or AIC (UK CAA, 2001a). Illustra-
68 tively, British Airport Authority (BAA)’s stated policy for air trafﬁc services in the Southeast of England is to set charges on the
69 basis of long-run MCs (cited in Starkie (2008)). However, its own research showed that the charges were actually well below
70 MCs and the loss was cross-subsidized by the proﬁt generated from the commercial revenues where prices are raised well above
71 costs (Starkie, 2008).
72 In spite of that, there has been a growing concern among certain airlines (e.g. Easyjet, Bmi) that CAA regulated prices do
73 not accurately reﬂect the differences in service quality offered by different terminal buildings within the same airport (UK
74 CAA, 2007: p. 188). Moreover, low-cost carriers (LCCs) frequently argue that they do not need complicated infrastructure
75 such as baggage-handling system,3 airbridges, or seat reservation IT programs at check-in desks,4 and hence, they should
76 not have to pay for facilities which they do not want to use (Competition Commission, 2002: p. 262). On top of that, LCCs also
77 claim that they impose lower costs on airport operations than full service and charter airlines as they generally have faster turn-
78 around times.
79 LCCs’ aggressive pursuit of lower airport charges is explained by their particular business model, in which cost minimi-
80 zation is paramount. Having pushed all other costs to minimal levels, airport charges are targeted for further reduction
81 (Doganis, 2002). These typically represent roughly 10% of the cost base under the traditional airline model, but it amounts
82 to a much higher share for LCCs as a result of frequent landing and taking-offs (Competition Commission, 2002). Airport costs
83 in some cases represent 70% of ticket prices and LCCs claim that their margins are tight and have to rely on volume to gen-
84 erate a return (UK CAA, 2003c). In Europe, LCCs are putting pressure on airports to reduce charges and/or to provide com-
85 mercial incentives by threatening to ﬂy elsewhere if these demands are not met (Lei and Papatheodorou, 2010). Given the
86 fact that LCCs now account for approximately 50% of intra-European passengers (Starkie, 2012), their demands cannot be
87 ignored by airport authorities and regulators.
88 Under the aforementioned MC principle, it is clear that airline operations that require lower infrastructure usage should
89 also face reduced prices (Gillen and Forsyth, 2010). In that regard, for the charges to remain cost-related, cheaper (i.e. less-
90 quality) infrastructure should be less expensive for the airlines; high utilization and effective use of airport facilities should
91 also be rewarded. While under such circumstances LCCs may have a point in demanding lower airport charges, the fact is
92 that in a recent report it was found that average charges vary according to airline type, and LCCs actually pay the lowest
93 charges at UK airports (Competition Commission, 2009). The cost-basis of said price differentiation policies, however, re-
94 mains to be empirically determined.
95 With this background, and using the UK airport industry as a case study, this paper aims to provide new empirical evi-
96 dence in support of airline-based differentiation in airport charges. The working hypothesis is that marginal passenger costs
97 are sensitive to the type of airline (i.e. full-service, charter, and low-cost) as they may signiﬁcantly differ in their use of air-
98 port infrastructure. Results are expected to lead to relevant policy and managerial conclusions regarding price discrimination
99 in the airport industry. In order to cover the basic regulatory approaches explained above, both long- and short-run multi-
100 output cost functions are estimated over an unbalanced pool database of 29 UK airports observed between 1995 and 2009.
101 The passenger output is hedonically-adjusted in order to introduce the desired level of disaggregation while keeping a par-
102 simonious speciﬁcation. A full schedule of MC and AIC estimates for the combined passenger categories will be provided for
103 all sample airports.
104 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature survey on the estimation of airport marginal
105 costs. Section 3 describes the UK airport sample and data sources while Section 4 introduces the cost frontier methodology.
106 This is followed by Section 5 which analyzes the resulting marginal cost estimates and their impact on optimal airport pric-
107 ing in the UK. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the main ﬁndings.
108 2. Literature review
109 Although many past studies have addressed the issue of airport pricing, only a few of them have focused on the monetary
110 valuation of airport MCs, featuring a variety of estimation methods and databases that make difﬁcult to compare their
1 These allow for MC mark-ups that are inversely proportional to the different users’ demand elasticities.
2 Price caps are allowed to grow with inﬂation (Retail Price Index) less a productivity incentive (X).
3 Note that LCCs do not generally operate connecting ﬂights.
4 Most LCCs do not allocate seats before passengers board the aircraft.
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111 results. An early example was Carlin and Park (1970), who calculated marginal runway costs for LaGuardia Airport (LGA),
112 focusing on delay costs and peak considerations. Their estimates range between $3 and $1090 for off-peak and peak arrivals,
113 respectively. Using simulation, BAA (1982) estimated peak and off-peak passenger charges at Heathrow and Gatwick. Con-
114 sidering that BAA policy was to charge peak users the costs of terminal construction (CAA, 2001b), results can be roughly
115 interpreted as an approximation to long- vs. short-run MCs. Peak passenger costs at Heathrow were estimated at £25.69–
116 £29.52 and off-peak costs of £0.76–£0.92 (1982 pounds). Morrison (1983) estimated several cost functions including oper-
117 ation, capital and delay expenditures in order to compute optimal long-run toll costs. He ﬁnally estimated a MC of $12.34
118 (1976 dollars) per aircraft movement (ATM). More recently, Link et al. (2006) made use of time-series data on staff costs that
119 led to an MC estimate for an extra ATM of €22.60 (2000 euros).
120 Additional references on second-best pricing for airports include Morrison (1982), Rendeiro (1997), and Rendeiro (2010).
121 These papers focus on Ramsey pricing and to date, there has been no attempt to estimate airport AICs in the literature.
122 2.1. Airport cost functions and economies of scale
123 According to the economic theory, the econometric estimation of parametric cost functions is the suitable methodology to
124 calculate MCs.5 An additional advantage of this approach is that it also allows for returns to scale to be calculated from the cost
125 function parameters. A cost function is a formal construction that links total or variable costs to outputs, input prices, and cap-
126 ital stock of ﬁrms whose behavior is assumed to be cost minimizing. Early examples of airport cost functions include Keeler
127 (1970) and Doganis and Thompson (1974), all of them limited for MC analysis by their use of Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcations.
128 Tolofari et al. (1990) used pooled data for seven BAA Airports between 1979 and 1987 to estimate both long- and short-run cost
129 functions. To allow for a ﬂexible functional form, they adopted the translogarithmic speciﬁcation (see Section 4). They found
130 economies of scale up to 20 million work-load units (WLUs).6 Also using UK data, Main et al. (2003) found scale economies
131 up to a minimum efﬁcient scale of 5 million WLUs.
132 A more recent approximation to the cost structure of UK airports is found in Bottasso and Conti (2012), who estimated a
133 variable short-run cost function using a panel of 25 UK airports between 1994 and 2005. Results support previous studies as
134 scale economies are found to be exhausted at around 5 million annual passengers, remaining at constant returns to scale
135 until approximately 14 million annual passengers. Finally, in order to complete the survey of returns to scale, it is also worth
136 noting the non-parametric approach7 by Assaf (2010a), who obtained bootstrapped estimates of scale elasticities using Data
137 Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Results show that most large airports (including Manchester and all airports serving the London
138 area) present constant or decreasing returns to scale while small airports tend to enjoy increasing returns. In summary, while
139 the existing literature on airport cost functions for the UK has not focused on MC estimations, a general agreement appears to
140 exist about the existence of returns to scale for small airports, in which case MC pricing would not lead to cost recovery unless
141 some sort of cross-subsidization is implemented.
142 2.2. Stochastic frontiers and output disaggregation
143 The calculation of social MCs of airports was one of the main objectives of project GRACE,8 funded by the European Com-
144 mission. Within that project’s framework, Martín et al. (2006) introduced the use of stochastic cost frontiers (as opposed to the
145 deterministic cost functions from the previous section) in order to eliminate any biases in MC estimates linked to a possible
146 inefﬁciency component. The stochastic frontier methodology has been applied in a large number of airport efﬁciency studies
147 including Pels et al. (2003),9 Oum et al. (2008), Barros (2008a,b, 2011), Martín et al. (2009), Assaf (2010b), Martín and
148 Voltes-Dorta (2011a), and Assaf et al. (2012). Due to the nonlinear complexities of these models, Bayesian inference is the most
149 common estimation method.
150 Martín et al. (2006) features the ﬁrst multi-output (ATM andWLU) cost frontier speciﬁcations, which allows for disaggre-
151 gated MCs to be calculated. Using an unbalanced database of 56 airports worldwide between 1991 and 2005, they estimated
152 two speciﬁcations (single- and multi-output) in order to show that MCs are biased in the single-output case. Long-run MC
153 estimates for the year 2005, at the average airport, were about $406.03 and $5.97 for ATM and WLU, respectively. Introduc-
154 ing terminal surface as a ﬁxed production factor, average short-run MC are $119.02 and $4.89 for ATM and WLU, respec-
155 tively. Using the same methodology over a sample of 37 Spanish airports, Martín et al. (2009) obtained long-run MC
156 estimates ranging between €80 up to €413 per ATM, and from €0.98 to €13.66 per WLU (1997 euros).
157 More recent academic contributions focus on increasing output disaggregation, expanding airport samples, and more
158 sophisticated cost function speciﬁcations. Oum et al. (2008) introduced a non-aeronautical output (commercial revenues-
159 REV) in the cost frontier speciﬁcation to avoid estimation biases. This is related to the impossibility of separating aeronau-
160 tical and non-aeronautical costs in the ﬁnancial data provided by the airports (annual reports and ﬁnancial statements).
161 Building on that contribution, Martín et al. (2011) estimated both long- and short-run cost functions for Spanish Airports,
5 As opposed to non-parametric methodologies such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
6 A work-load unit aggregates a passenger and 100 kg of cargo.
7 Non-parametric studies on UK airport efﬁciency include Parker (1999) and Barros and Weber (2009).
8 Generalisation of Research on Accounts and Cost Estimation. http://www.grace-eu.org/project.htm.
9 They estimated a production frontier.
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162 now featuring ATM, WLU, and REV. The introduction of the new output, as expected, led to a signiﬁcant reduction of the
163 aeronautical MCs, which now averaged €273 and €1.08 for ATMs and WLUs in the long run (€15.44 and €0.79 in the short
164 run).
165 Martín and Voltes-Dorta (2011a) further disaggregated the output vector in order to approximate the complexity of air-
166 port operations. Thus, WLUs were split in cargo, domestic passengers and international/transborder passengers. In addition,
167 ATMs were hedonically-adjusted (Spady and Friedlaender, 1978) using the airport’s average maximum take-off weight
168 (MTOW) as a quality variable. The output vector was completed with the non-aeronautical output (REV). In order to support
169 such level of disaggregation a much larger airport sample was employed, featuring 161 all-size airports worldwide observed
170 between 1991 and 2008. Note that, besides a concern for the available degrees of freedom, a large database is required to
171 mitigate the potential impact of multicollinearity10 arising from high linear correlation among the speciﬁed outputs (e.g. pas-
172 sengers, ATM, and REV). Results found evidence of unexhausted economies of scale in airport operations (beyond 80 million
173 annual passengers), as well as evidence supporting the WLU disaggregation: international passengers imposed higher MC than
174 domestic ones, and both were signiﬁcantly costlier for the airports than cargo operations, which remains mostly an airline activ-
175 ity. Using the hedonic ATM equation, MCs estimates featuring increasing unit rates per ton MTOW were obtained.11
176 Taking into account that this paper employs a smaller airport sample (27 UK airports), it is difﬁcult to include as many
177 outputs and interactions as the international studies. While this appears to contradict our stated objective of providing a new
178 approach for output disaggregation, it is important to understand the restrictions imposed by the dataset in terms of degrees
179 of freedom. In order to illustrate that, Table 1 shows the output choices for all previous cost frontier studies using only UK
180 airport data.
181 From this table, it is clear that single-output speciﬁcations have been the preferred approach to formalize UK airport tech-
182 nology, featuring in both early and recent contributions regardless of sample size. This is discussed in Assaf et al. (2012), who
183 developed a state-of-the-art dynamic SCF model to estimate UK airport efﬁciency and its determinants. They argued that
184 operating revenue is an appropriate indicator of the airports’ overall output level, in substitution of the physical units, for
185 the purposes of performance assessment. This approach, however, is not suitable for our research objectives since it does
186 not allow for output-speciﬁc MCs to be obtained.
187 Barros (2008a) estimated the ﬁrst multi-output SCF speciﬁcation for UK airports including both PAX and ATMs as outputs.
188 While a very strong correlation between both variables is certain, this issue is of little relevance for the purposes of that pa-
189 per since multicollinearity does not affect the predictive capacity of the model, and, in turn, the reliability of the efﬁciency
190 estimates obtained from the SCF. On the other hand, Bottasso and Conti (2012) included up to four outputs in their cost func-
191 tion (ATM, PAX, CGO and REV) with the objective to calculate economies of scale for UK airports. This study, however, did not
192 estimate MCs and linear correlations among the outputs are not discussed. Since our study shares a very similar dataset, we
193 are able to address this issue in Section 4, while also proposing a novel strategy to increase output disaggregation for esti-
194 mating airport MCs, i.e. hedonically-adjusting the passenger output. This aspect, rather than improving the estimation
195 method,12 becomes the technical contribution of our paper that supports the policy discussion about airline-based price dis-
196 crimination at UK airports.
197 3. Database and data sources
198 The short- and long-run cost frontiers were estimated over an unbalanced pool of ﬁnancial, trafﬁc, and infrastructure data
199 on 27 UK commercial airports between 1995 and 2009, for a grand total of 381 observations. It is worth noting that using a
200 single-country sample allows for better homogeneity and comparability, especially in regard to external factors that can
Table 1
UK-speciﬁc airport cost frontier studies.
Author(s) Data sample (UK) Method Output vector
Doganis and Thompson (1974) CS 18 airports, 1969 Cobb–Douglas CF WLU
Tolofari et al. (1990) P 7 airports, 1979–1987 Translog CF WLU
Main et al. (2003) CS 27 airports 1988 Cobb–Douglas CF PAX or WLU (alternative models)
Barros (2008a) P 27 airports 2000–2005 Translog SCF PAX, ATM
Assaf (2009) P 27 airports 2002–2007 Cobb–Douglas CF Operating income
Assaf et al. (2012) P 26 airports 1998–2008 Translog SCF Operating revenue
Bottasso and Conti (2012) P 25 airports 1994–2005 Translog CF ATM, WLU, REV or ATM, PAX, CGO, REV
Note: CS: cross-section, P: panel, CF: cost function, SCF: stochastic cost frontier, WLU: workload units, PAX: passengers, ATM: aircraft movements, REV:
commercial revenues, CGO: cargo trafﬁc.
10 Since the calculation of MCs requires making structural analysis on the cost function coefﬁcients, estimation biases, such as those related to
multicollinearity, need to be avoided.
11 The same method was used in Voltes-Dorta and Pagliari (2012) but they did not provide MC estimates.
12 More advanced estimation methods such as the above-mentioned dynamic SCF model developed by Assaf et al. (2012) are not implemented in this paper
since the improvements with respect to our method are related to estimation of efﬁciency, which is not the main focus of this paper.
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201 affect airport costs and their operating performance such as e.g. accounting practices, regulatory framework, labor regula-
202 tions, or weather conditions.
203 Data collection was completed for the following variables: (a) total costs: capital (cap), labor (lab), and materials (mat);
204 (b) outputs: Full-service (fsc), low-cost (lcc), and charter (cha) passengers, aircraft movements (atms), commercial (non-
205 aviation) revenues (rev); (c) ﬁxed factors: terminal surface (ter), runway length (run), runway capacity (runcap), boarding
206 gates (gat), check-in desks (chk), (d) other: time (t), full-time equivalent employees of the Airport Authority (fte). For homo-
207 geneity purposes, all monetary variables were adjusted for inﬂation using UK’s Retail Price Index (RPI).
208 Total costs (TC) will be the dependent variable in the long-run model. In the short run, only labor and materials, the
209 variable costs (VC), are considered. Labor costs include all types of employee compensation, such as salaries and wages,
210 retirement and health beneﬁts. Only the employees of the reporting authority, typically the airport operator, are considered
211 as they are the decision-making units in this study. We deﬁne ‘‘Material costs’’ as a very broad category that covers any air-
212 port expenditure not directly attributable to in-house labor or capital costs.13 Hence, it includes maintenance, utilities, exter-
213 nal services and other administrative costs. Capital costs aggregate amortization of ﬁxed assets and interest paid, following the
214 deﬁnition by Doganis (1992). Note that these costs include all activities performed in-house,14 which are not heterogeneous
215 across airports. In addition, amortization charges are sensitive to each airport’s investment cycle. It is also worth pointing
216 out that commercial revenue activities may have signiﬁcant impact on operating cost as airports have to incur additional costs
217 such as marketing, product promotion, retail operations staff to the generation of commercial revenue (BAA, 2001). Section 4
218 discusses how the proposed methodology for calculating input prices brings this heterogeneity into the cost function estima-
219 tion. Table 2 provides the mean, range, and standard deviation of the most important variables for the cost frontier estimation.
220 The scale of production ranges between 497 annual passengers at Southend Airport in 1995 and slightly over 69 million annual
221 passengers (mppa) at London Heathrow in 2007. The average sample airport serves about 7 mppa (thereof 17% low-cost and
222 33% charter) and it is able to obtain almost £60 million in non-aviation revenues. However, given the logarithmic transforma-
223 tion, the translog approximation point will be located at the vector of geometric means (slightly under 2 million passengers).
224 The largest cost element is ‘‘materials’’ with an average 50% cost share. Capital inputs only account for 18% of annual operating
225 costs at the average airport, which would bring long- and short-run MC estimates closer.
226 Financial data was collected from the UK Airport Statistics compiled by the Centre for Regulated Industries at the Univer-
227 sity of Bath (e.g. Sharp et al., 2010). Since this publication was recently discontinued, the year 2009 was completed using the
228 2009/2010 issue prepared by Leigh-Fisher (2011). Airports with reporting periods different than 12 months (typically 9 or
229 15 months) were proportionally adjusted for homogeneity purposes. Since trafﬁc data was easier to adapt to each airport’s
230 reporting period, calendar vs. ﬁnancial year ﬁgures were mixed in the database, with the small differences accounted for by
231 the time variable (t). Furthermore, cost and revenues were adjusted for inﬂation using UK’s Retail Price Index (RPI). UK CAA
232 statistics were the main source for passenger data (CAA, 2011). Scheduled passengers were separated in full-service and low-
233 cost using a database also provided by the UK CAA. Infrastructure data, including runway capacity was compiled from a vari-
234 ety of sources, including annual reports, public consultation documents, press releases, and by direct request.
235 4. Cost frontier estimation
236 A cost function is a formal construction that links operating costs with outputs (y) and input prices (w) of ﬁrms whose
237 behavior is assumed to be cost-minimizing. If that assumption cannot be made, some degree of (positively-truncated) cost
238 inefﬁciency can be added to the disturbance term (u), thus separating this effect from the statistical noise (v). This is a sto-
239 chastic long-run cost frontier (Eq. (1)). If some inputs, however, are to be considered ﬁxed in the short-run, then their price is
240 substituted by the ﬁxed factor demand (K), in that case, only variable costs (VC) are modeled (Eq. (2)). A time trend (t) can be
241 added in both models to account for technical change.
242
C ¼ Cðw; y; tÞ þ uþ v ð1Þ244
245
VC ¼ VCðw; y;K; tÞ þ uþ v ð2Þ247
248 The preferred functional form for C(w, y, t) and VC(w, y, K, t) is the translog (Christensen et al., 1973) as it does not impose
249 restrictions to the underlying technology.
250 4.1. Output vector
251 The cost function features passengers (hedonically-adjusted by airline type) and commercial revenues as outputs.
252 In order to meet our research objectives, the level of disaggregation in the output vector must allow for airline-speciﬁc
253 MCs to be calculated and compared to the established price caps. Also, results should allow us to discuss the single- or dual-
254 till nature of the regulated prices. From a methodological perspective, this requires: (i) the separation of aeronautical and
13 Other studies simply deﬁne this category as ‘‘other costs’’.
14 The same applies to commercial revenues.
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255 non-aeronautical outputs in the cost function, and (ii) the speciﬁcation of airline-speciﬁc aeronautical outputs. Due to the
256 small sample, this must be achieved while keeping a parsimonious speciﬁcation and also avoiding multicollinearity.
257 Previous literature has employed aircraft movements (ATMs), passengers (PAX), and cargo (CGO) as the traditional aero-
258 nautical outputs in airport efﬁciency and productivity studies (Assaf et al., 2012). Introducing ATMs has the advantage of
259 producing more detailed MCs but only for larger samples that provide enough airport variability. In our case, ATMs were
260 discarded given their extremely high level of linear correlation with passenger trafﬁc (92.7%). This will allow, however,
261 for a direct comparison between the estimated passenger MCs (now accounting for airside and landside costs) and the pub-
262 lished price caps at Heathrow or Gatwick, typically set as ‘‘maximum revenue per passenger’’. Cargo trafﬁc, measured in ton-
263 nes, was also discarded to save degrees of freedom, due to lack of signiﬁcance in the estimated cost function. This is not
264 surprising as cargo operation is a much an airline activity and a less important dimension of output than passenger numbers
265 for UK airports (NERA, 2001).
266 This leaves passenger trafﬁc as the sole aeronautical output, upon which the airline disaggregation needs to be imple-
267 mented. Splitting the passenger output in airline categories (i.e. full-service, low-cost, and charter) has the enormous advan-
268 tage of allowing for airport-speciﬁc airline-disaggregated MCs to be calculated. However, this also leads to a dramatic
269 increase in the cost function parameters that makes this option only suitable for large samples. An alternative strategy is
270 to use the hedonic approach (Spady and Friedlaender, 1978), in which output differentiation is introduced with only few
271 added coefﬁcients15 (linked to the airline categories). Thus, hedonically-adjusted passengers (paxh) are deﬁned as the aeronau-
272 tical output with the following expression:
273
paxh ¼ paxew1slccew2scha ð3Þ275
276
lnpaxh ¼ ln paxþ w1slcc þ w2scha ð4Þ278
279 where slcc and scha represent low-cost and charter trafﬁc shares, respctively. In order to avoid zero values in the translog
280 speciﬁcation, these shares are not logged (Eq. (4)). A value of w higher or lower than zero indicates that the relevant passen-
281 ger category imposes, on average, higher or lower costs to the airport than full-service carriers (fsc) in proportion ew. Also
282 note that the signiﬁcance of these hedonic parameters provides a test for MC differentiation based on airline type, which
283 is our main working hypothesis.
284 The only candidate for non-aeronautical output is commercial revenue (REV). This variable was regressed against the
285 remaining exogenous covariates for an approximate estimate of the Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF). A VIF marginally under
286 5 was obtained (R2 = 0.799), which is the commonly accepted threshold for severe mutlicollinearity. Thus, the variable was
287 included, helping to introduce dual-till considerations in the interpretation of results.
288 4.2. Input prices
289 The long-run cost system features three input prices, capital (wc), materials (wm), and labor/personnel (wp). Labor prices
290 are obtained by dividing labor costs by the number of full-time equivalent employees of the airport authority (fte).16 Since
291 the other cost categories encompass a heterogeneous set of inputs, quantity indexes for capital (iqc) and materials (iqm) were
292 constructed.17 Assuming that competitive tendering for airport service contracts is successful in bringing prices close to com-
Table 2
Database summary.
Total
costs
(GBP’000)
Variable
costs
(GBP’000)
Total
passengers
Share
low-
cost
Share
charter
Commercial
revenues
(GBP’000)
Terminal
surface
(m2)
Runway
length
(m)
Share
capital
cost
Share
material
cost
Share
labor
cost
Max 1,844,900 970,800 69,334,563 0.77 1.00 740,300 691,665 7561 0.56 0.88 0.69
Min 3410 3247 497 0.00 0.00 170 1000 1508 0.02 0.07 0.03
Mean 86,794 64,120 7,117,190 0.17 0.33 59,335 46,524 2822 0.18 0.49 0.33
Std 191,679 129,287 13,248,067 0.21 0.24 140,845 81,004 1.470 0.10 0.12 0.10
Geom – – 1,931,794 – – 16,621 – – – – –
Note: Monetary variables expressed in 2009 prices.
15 This advantage was noted by Oum and Threteway (1989).
16 This approach is the most commonly used in the literature. One may argue that different outsourcing practices across the airport sample lead to
inconsistent unit labor costs. Bottasso and Conti (2012) compared this traditional method against an alternative approach of using average wages in the
respective local authorities as labor prices. They did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the estimated models.
17 Recent papers on UK airport cost functions provide alternative methods for estimating the price of materials. Bottasso and Conti (2012) construct a price
index for ‘‘other costs’’ by combining construction, utilities, and retail price indexes. The aggregation weights are based on the breakdown of ‘‘other costs’’ in
BAA’s accounts. This information, however, is not available at an airport level for the entire sample and there is no reason to assume that BAA’s cost breakdown
is representative of the UK airport industry. A simpler method is proposed by Assaf et al. (2012), who used regional price indexes as proxy for the price of
materials. These indexes however, have only been released in 2000, 2004, and 2010 by the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS), which, furthermore, indicates
that the indexes are not fully comparable due to methodological differences (ONS, 2010).
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293 petitive levels, input quantity indexes can be constructed using the individual marginal productivities (MPs) as aggregation
294 weights (Martín and Voltes-Dorta, 2011a). Thus, iqc combines terminal surface (ter) and runway length (run). In the case of
295 materials costs, iqm combines boarding gates (gat) and check-in desks (chk). Even though these variables are mostly ﬁxed, in
296 combination with the MPs they are assumed to be good indicators for the airports’ annual demand for utilities, maintenance,
297 etc.
298
iqc ¼ ter þ runMPrun
MPter
; wc ¼ capitalcostsiqc ð5Þ300
301
iqm ¼ gat þ chkMPchk
MPgat
; wm ¼ materialscostsiqm ð6Þ303
304 Airport-speciﬁc MPs are estimated from the only available multi-output ray production frontier for the airport industry
305 (Martín and Voltes-Dorta, 2011a). Finally, wc and wm are calculated by dividing the respective costs by the quantity
306 indexes.18 As these prices are directly related to the observed costs, they reﬂect each airport’s speciﬁc circumstances (i.e., scope
307 of outsourcing, investment cycles, etc.). In order to illustrate this, Figs. 1 and 2 show the evolution of estimated factor prices at
308 selected airports.
309 The sharp increase in factor prices at Heathrow in recent years is related to the new Terminal 5. This price effect, with the
310 subsequent frontier shift, helps offsetting the increased technical inefﬁciency commonly associated with airport expansions
311 and temporary excess capacity. The same applies to Manchester Airport with the inauguration of the skylink back in 1997
312 and to Luton after the ownership change in 1998. It is also worth noting the apparent convergence in capital prices between
313 East Midlands and its ‘‘parent’’ airport, after the ﬁrst was acquired by Manchester Airport Group. However, the similarity
314 does not extend to the price of materials, given the signiﬁcantly higher degree of outsourcing at East Midlands, which trans-
315 lates into reduced in-house expenditures. A similar effect is found at Cardiff, where only the ‘‘core activities’’ and estate man-
316 agement (see Sharp et al., 2010) are performed by the airport company. Finally, the lack of signiﬁcant infrastructure
317 developments at London Southend during the sample period clearly accounts for the reduced cost of capital. All this heter-
318 ogeneity is brought into the model as an exogenous component, thus allowing for fair efﬁciency comparisons between dif-
319 ferent airports as the technological frontier adapts to the different levels of expenditure.
320 Furthermore, since delayed passengers spend more time in the terminals and congested runways increase stand occupa-
321 tion, the estimated prices can also be expected to react to capacity constraints if increased congestion has a signiﬁcant im-
322 pact on infrastructure usage. In order to support that assumption, a simple runway congestion indicator was constructed by
323 dividing observed aircraft movements by annual runway capacity (ranging between 0.01 at Southend and 1.00 at Gatwick). A
324 positive and signiﬁcant Pearson correlation coefﬁcient was found between the congestion indicator and the estimated cap-
325 ital and materials prices.19
326 4.3. Model speciﬁcation
327 The cost frontier is completed with the time variable (t) in order to account for technical change. Both models are esti-
328 mated as systems of equations featuring the input cost shares (sj) that are regressed against their theoretical expressions.20 A
329 set of parametric restrictions were included in order to impose linear homogeneity in w. Concavity is checked a posteriori by
330 calculating the elasticities of substitution in the sample average. Full speciﬁcations are shown in Appendix A.
331 Given the non-linear complexity of the proposed hedonic model, Bayesian inference and numerical models are the pre-
332 ferred method for estimation (Van der Broeck et al., 1994). We adapt the stochastic frontier codiﬁcation provided in Grifﬁn
333 and Steel (2007). This assumes that the dependent variable (i.e. the logarithm of the total or variable costs) is normally dis-
334 tributed, with the aforementioned translog speciﬁcation as the mean and r2v as the white noise variance (Eqs. (7) and (8)).
335 The parameter of technical inefﬁciency uit is allowed to vary systematically over time with airport-speciﬁc effects gi, follow-
336 ing Cuesta (2000). Note that a negative gi indicates that the airport increases efﬁciency over time (T is the baseline year
337 2009). The ﬁrm’s average inefﬁciency ui is assumed to be exponentially distributed with mean k1 (Eq. (9)).
338
ln TCit  Nðln TCitðw; Y;w; tÞ þ uit;r2v Þ ð7Þ340
341
lnVCit  NðlnVCitðw;Y ;K;w; tÞ þ uit;r2v Þ ð8Þ343
344
uit  exp giðt  TÞf gui; where ui  expðkÞ ð9Þ346
18 Note that the short-run model features the capital quantity index (iqc) as ﬁxed factor, in place of wc.
19 The estimated correlation coefﬁcients, with their respective 95% CIs are: 0.235 [0.138–0.328] and 0.274 [0.179–0.365] for capital and materials,
respectively.
20 Input cost shares are obtained by differentiating logged costs with respect to logged prices. All share equations are included because no singularity
problems may arise in this type of Bayesian estimation.
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347 Prior distributions must be assigned to the parameters. Cost frontier coefﬁcients (b) follow a non-informative normal dis-
348 tribution with mean zero and inﬁnite variance. In the same spirit, a gamma distribution (0.01, 0.01) is assigned to the white
349 noise inverse-variance. The distributional structure of technical inefﬁciency, via the k parameter, allows us to impose prior
350 ideas about mean efﬁciency (r) in the airport industry. This is set at 0.85 in accordance with the previous literature. The
351 prior distributions of gi and the hedonic coefﬁcients w was chosen to be a zero-mean normal distribution with an in-
352 verse-variance of 10 that allows for a reasonable spread.
353
b  Nð0;0Þ; r2v  Gð0:01;0:01Þ; k  expð log rÞ; gi  Nð0;10Þ; w  Nð0;10Þ ð10Þ355
356 Input share equations are modeled using a similar codiﬁcation than that of the cost frontier (i.e. normally distributed) with
357 correlated error terms.
358 4.4. Technological indicators
359 Once the cost function parameters have been estimated, airport-speciﬁc MCs for the hedonic passenger output (paxh) are
360 calculated by evaluating the expressions below at sample levels (see Jara-Díaz, 2007):
361
Long-run : MCpaxh ¼ @ lnC
@ ln paxh
bC
paxh
; Short-run : MCpaxh ¼ @ lnVC
@ ln paxh
cVC
paxh
ð11Þ
363
364 where bC and VbC indicate predicted (i.e. efﬁcient) total or variable costs, respectively.
365 Long-run economies of scale (S) and short-run economies of capacity utilization (ECU) are calculated as well:
366
Long-run : S ¼
X
j
@ lnC
@ ln yj
 !1
; Short-run : ECU ¼
X
j
@ lnVC
@ ln yj
 !1
ð12Þ
368
369 where j = (paxh, rev).
370 Average incremental costs (AIC) are presented as second-best pricing references. The incremental cost (IC) of output j is
371 deﬁned as the cost of adding the jth output’s production to the vector of outputs produced by the airport. The AIC of output j
372 is then obtained as the ratio between the IC and the same output’s level of production (yj). For the relevant paxh output, the
373 expressions are as follows:
Fig. 1. Evolution of estimated capital prices at selected airports (base year 2009).
Fig. 2. Evolution of estimated materials prices at selected airports (base year 2009).
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374
ICpaxh ¼ Cðpaxh; revÞ  Cð0; revÞ AICpaxh ¼ ICpaxhypaxh
ð13Þ
376
377 Since the translog speciﬁcation does not allow us to estimate ICs,21 AICs are approximated using an alternative formula
378 provided by Jara-Díaz (2007):
379
AICpaxh ¼MCpaxhSpaxh AICpaxh ¼MCpaxhECUpaxh ð14Þ381
382 where the output-speciﬁc scale elasticities (Spaxh or ECUpaxh – also not available for calculation) are assumed equal to the air-
383 port’s global level (S or ECU).22
384 Finally, note that paxh refers to the reference airline type, i.e. full-service. The estimated hedonic proportions are used to
385 derive the MCs and AICs of the others,23 i.e. MClcc =MCfscew1.
386 5. Results and discussion
387 Both models were run on WinBUGS (Lunn et al., 2000) and convergence was achieved after 100,000 random draws.24
388 Table 3 shows the long-run cost system estimation results. It is clearly seen that most relevant parameters are signiﬁcant
389 and show the expected signs. The scale elasticity at the average airport in 2009 (the reference year) can easily be obtained
390 as the inverse of the sum of the ﬁrst-order output coefﬁcients (rev and paxh). It yields 1.99 (std. deviation: 0.29), indicating
391 the existence of signiﬁcant returns to scale at the approximation point (slightly under 2 million passengers). As seen in
392 Fig. 3, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale at that level of output can be rejected.
393 The estimated parameters also indicate the presence of non-neutral technological progress, both in inputs and in scale. In
394 particular, the negative sign of the t  rev parameter shows that the maximum output size that allows UK airports to enjoy
395 scale economies (i.e. the industry’s minimum efﬁcient scale-MES) has been expanded by the increasing importance of non-
396 aviation activities on airport operations. The last decade has also seen increase the importance of capital costs on airport
397 operations, to the detriment of materials and labor costs. Average long-run inefﬁciency in 2009 is calculated as
398 k1 = 21.44%. No conclusions regarding increasing or decreasing efﬁciency in the sample period can be drawn since the aver-
399 age eta parameter is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
400 Regarding the hedonic coefﬁcients, both are signiﬁcant25 and support the main working hypothesis of this paper. The neg-
401 ative sign of wlcc indicates that low-cost passengers can be served at a reduced marginal cost (69.6%) in comparison with those
402 traveling on full-service airlines. This is clearly related to the signiﬁcantly lower infrastructure demands of low-cost carriers,
403 which are typically assigned low-quality piers or, in a few cases, may even have no-frills terminals built for them. In addition,
404 it is widely acknowledged in the industry that the low-cost business model is based on higher aircraft utilization rates that rest
405 upon shorter turnaround times, short-haul routes and smaller, homogeneous, aircraft types. Reduced runway damage costs (re-
406 lated to tire pressure and aircraft weight) can also be present since low-cost carriers usually carry less or no belly cargo (Button,
407 2011). All these factors reduce their capital usage and hence the long-run marginal costs. From a ﬁnancial perspective, our re-
408 sults would support low-cost airlines’ claims for lower airport charges. Charter passengers, on the contrary, are found to cost
409 33% more than full service. This is likely related to the fact that the charter business is very seasonal and their ﬂights tend
410 to be at ﬁxed intervals such as 7 or 14 days, which leads to low weekly and annual utilization of airport facilities. In addition,
411 charter operations normally concentrate at peak times, also having aircraft parked for longer periods making charter carriers
412 more expensive to serve (Competition Commission, 2009). Moreover, charter passengers tend to spend more time in the termi-
413 nals, carry heavier baggage and often travel on aircraft with very high load factors (normally over 90%), that take longer to
414 board. Furthermore, almost 100% of charter passengers are international, as opposed to 60–70% for full service or LCC passen-
415 gers, hence the former make more use of immigration and custom facilities, further imposing higher operating costs to airports.
416 If terminal use charges ignore these cost differences, airports would be implicitly allowing cross-subsidization from low-cost
417 and full-service to charter passengers, thus defeating the purpose of MC pricing and limiting its potential beneﬁts.
418 Table 4 shows the short-run cost system estimation results. Note that the ﬁrst-order ﬁxed factor coefﬁcient is clearly sig-
419 niﬁcant, indicating some degree of short-run disequilibrium in the UK airport industry. Using the same method as before,
420 signiﬁcant economies of capacity utilization-ECU at the average airport in 2009 are found (from Fig. 3, average: 1.69, std
421 deviation: 0.21). Technological progress is also present but only the output interaction is signiﬁcant. Average short-run cost
422 inefﬁciency in 2009 is calculated as k1 = 26.80%. The hedonic coefﬁcients are both signiﬁcant and lead to the same conclu-
423 sions as before, yet price discrimination would now be justiﬁed on the basis of different non-capital usage. Note that the MC
424 difference in comparison with full-service passengers is accentuated in this second model.
425 Table 5 provides airport-speciﬁcMCs, scale elasticities, ECUs, and AIC estimates for the year 2009 (full conﬁdence intervals
426 are provided in Appendix B). The reduced cost share of capital in the UK airport industry, combined with the increased cost
21 Note that the translog is not analytic in zero.
22 The airport’s global scale elasticity is a weighted average of the output-speciﬁc ones (Jara-Díaz, 2007).
23 This method assumes that the MC proportion between different passenger categories is constant throughout the UK airport industry and across the sample
period. Lack of degrees of freedom precluded us from using a more sophisticated hedonic speciﬁcation.
24 Convergence was checked using the Gelman-Rubin statistic implemented in WinBUGS.
25 psi[cha] is signiﬁcant at a 90% conﬁdence level.
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427 elasticity of the passenger output under a short-run speciﬁcation, lead to similar long- and short-run MC estimates in most
428 small andmedium-size airports. Larger differences, however, are found at LondonHeathrow, due to the recent opening of Ter-
429 minal 5. With much higher long-runMCs than all other airports,26 the results also conﬁrm the pervasive view that Heathrow is
430 an expensive airport to use due to its capital intensive, complex facilities as a hub airport and severe capacity constraints. As ex-
431 pected, returns to scale and economies of capacity tend to decrease with airport size. In particular, note that London Heathrow is
432 very close to reaching its efﬁcient scale in the long run while operating slightly over capacity in the short run.27 This proximity to
433 constant returns would make either long- or short-runMCs the ideal price benchmarks at UK’s main gateway. In the case of Lon-
434 don Gatwick, a slight departure from short-run MC would be acceptable, while AIC is arguably the preferred dual-till alternative
435 in the long run. The same applies to Stansted or Manchester, where higher scale elasticities are found.
436 These results, as well as any hypothetical cross-subsidies between passenger categories, are shown in Fig. 4. The four
437 charts present the evolution of established price caps at these (currently or historically) designated airports against the esti-
438 mated price benchmarks between 2000 and 2009 (thus partially covering three regulatory periods, from the end of Q3 to the
439 beginning of Q5). Historical data on price regulation at UK airports can be obtained from the CAA website. Price caps are
440 expressed in terms of ‘‘maximum revenue per passenger’’ in current prices. Note that all our MC and AIC estimates were also
441 converted to current prices. Table 6 provides complementary information on trafﬁc distribution at these airports in order to
442 facilitate the analysis.
443 Results, as expected, agree with CAA’s declared long-run approach to airport pricing in all cases. In addition, there is need
444 to consider the single-till nature of all price caps (see, e.g. CAA, 2003a and CAA, 2003b). This clearly applies to the case of
445 Heathrow Airport (that serves only full-service passenger trafﬁc), where a slight level of cross-subsidization from commer-
446 cial activities is present. Note that price caps are systematically set below aeronautical cost recovery, in a trend that has
447 accentuated in recent years, probably due to the capacity expansions. In that regard, and taking into account the estimated
448 MCs and AICs represent the technological ‘‘efﬁcient’’ minimum, it can be assumed that the actual single-till subsidization is
449 much more signiﬁcant.
450 For the purposes of this paper, however, the case of Gatwick Airport is much more interesting. In the last decade, Gatwick
451 has seen a signiﬁcant shift from charter to low-cost operations, while the full-service trafﬁc share has remained fairly con-
Table 3
Long-run cost system parameter estimates.
Node Mean Std. dev. MC error 2.50% Median 97.50% Sample
Constant 9.8050 0.0598 0.0029 9.6780 9.8080 9.9140 100,000
rev 0.1047 0.0504 0.0016 0.0056 0.1050 0.2023 100,000
wc 0.2132 0.0062 0.0001 0.2010 0.2132 0.2254 100,000
wm 0.4702 0.0062 0.0001 0.4580 0.4703 0.4824 100,000
wp 0.3166 0.0062 0.0000 0.3043 0.3165 0.3289 100,000
rev wc 0.0034 0.0045 0.0000 0.0122 0.0034 0.0054 100,000
rev wm 0.0115 0.0046 0.0000 0.0027 0.0116 0.0204 100,000
rev wp 0.0081 0.0048 0.0000 0.0176 0.0081 0.0013 100,000
0.5 wc2 0.0872 0.0059 0.0000 0.0756 0.0872 0.0988 100,000
wc wm 0.0545 0.0046 0.0000 0.0635 0.0545 0.0455 100,000
wc wp 0.0256 0.0060 0.0000 0.0373 0.0256 0.0139 100,000
0.5 wm2 0.1089 0.0073 0.0000 0.0946 0.1089 0.1232 100,000
wm wp 0.0529 0.0072 0.0000 0.0669 0.0530 0.0389 100,000
0.5 wp2 0.0243 0.0232 0.0002 0.0207 0.0242 0.0700 100,000
0.5  rev2 0.0142 0.0302 0.0006 0.0457 0.0145 0.0728 100,000
time 0.0047 0.0057 0.0003 0.0157 0.0045 0.0058 100,000
time  rev 0.0081 0.0037 0.0001 0.0154 0.0081 0.0009 100,000
time wc 0.0039 0.0008 0.0000 0.0024 0.0039 0.0055 100,000
time wm 0.0012 0.0008 0.0000 0.0028 0.0012 0.0004 100,000
time wp 0.0020 0.0008 0.0000 0.0036 0.0020 0.0004 100,000
paxh 0.3961 0.0433 0.0017 0.3080 0.3972 0.4782 100,000
paxh wc 0.0231 0.0044 0.0000 0.0317 0.0231 0.0146 100,000
paxh wm 0.0173 0.0042 0.0000 0.0090 0.0173 0.0256 100,000
paxh wp 0.0039 0.0046 0.0000 0.0052 0.0039 0.0130 100,000
0.5  paxh2 0.0816 0.0155 0.0006 0.0504 0.0820 0.1110 100,000
paxh  rev 0.0189 0.0274 0.0009 0.0339 0.0186 0.0734 100,000
time  paxh 0.0004 0.0026 0.0001 0.0047 0.0004 0.0054 100,000
psi[lcc] 0.3615 0.1410 0.0048 0.6395 0.3623 0.0797 100,000
psi[cha] 0.2860 0.1656 0.0064 0.0499 0.2923 0.5952 100,000
lambda 4.6630 1.2820 0.0481 2.5910 4.5150 7.5710 100,000
Note: rev: commercial revenues, wc: capital price, wm: material price, wp: labor price, paxh: hedonically-adjusted passengers.
26 With the exception of Coventry whose MCs were mainly due to its small scale of operation.
27 As seen in Appendix B, both long- and short-run scale elasticities at Heathrow (and also Gatwick) are not signiﬁcantly above constant returns. In spite of
that, the overall density of probability clearly favors the hypothesis of increasing returns in both cases.
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452 stant at around 60%. Fig. 4 shows that, during the regulatory period 2003–2008 (Q4), price caps converge to the long-run
453 marginal costs imposed by full service passengers, catching up with aeronautical cost recovery at the beginning of Q5. This
454 situation would be very close to optimal dual-till pricing without passenger differentiation, but our estimates reveal the exis-
455 tence of strong cross-subsidies from low-cost to charter. From a theoretical perspective, this departure from MC pricing
456 would distort airline demands for airport capacity. Thus, the existing regulatory regime will not lead to optimal usage
457 and valid investment signals, properties that would be highly desirable to price such a congested airport as Gatwick. Stan-
458 sted airport has been historically priced above cost recovery levels, which brings into question the single-till nature of CAA
459 pricing approach. In addition, at price-cap levels low-cost airlines, which are predominant at the airport, would again be se-
460 verely overcharged. Thus, our results deﬁnitely call for a more differentiated approach to price regulation in the UK.
461 Manchester airport was de-designated in 2009. A very strong efﬁciency incentive (5% below RPI) was set during Q4 that
462 allowed for a near perfect convergence to long-run MCs by the end of the period. While again the price-cap level would gen-
463 erate cross-subsidization between airline types, the regulatory discussion is not as relevant in this case due to the existence
464 of data conﬁrming that price discrimination has already been applied at the airport. While the actual charges paid by the
465 airlines are usually conﬁdential, some details were revealed in a Competition Commission’s investigation of Manchester
466 Airport in 2002 (Competition Commission, 2002). It was estimated that British Airways (largest airline), would have paid
467 £6.08 per passenger. The level of charges paid by four large charter carriers (MyTravel, JMC, Air2000 and Britannia), ranged
468 from £6.55 to £6.71. By contrast, Ryanair only paid £4.29 per passenger in the same period. Given the fact that Ryanair car-
469 ried only 326,200 passengers at Manchester Airport in 2001/02, the substantially lower charge can be assumed to reﬂect
Table 4
Short-run Cost System parameter estimates.
Node Mean Std. dev. MC error 2.50% Median 97.50% Sample
Constant 9.5550 0.0679 0.0026 9.4130 9.5580 9.6820 100,000
rev 0.1091 0.0544 0.0012 0.0003 0.1098 0.2138 100,000
iqc 0.1071 0.0499 0.0010 0.0107 0.1064 0.2064 100,000
wm 0.5927 0.0068 0.0000 0.5794 0.5927 0.6060 100,000
wp 0.4073 0.0068 0.0000 0.3940 0.4073 0.4206 100,000
rev wm 0.0118 0.0055 0.0000 0.0011 0.0118 0.0225 100,000
rev wp 0.0118 0.0055 0.0000 0.0225 0.0118 0.0011 100,000
iqc wm 0.0138 0.0135 0.0000 0.0126 0.0137 0.0402 100,000
iqc wp 0.0048 0.0137 0.0000 0.0316 0.0048 0.0222 100,000
0.5 wm2 0.1049 0.0092 0.0000 0.0869 0.1049 0.1228 100,000
wm wp 0.0914 0.0091 0.0000 0.1091 0.0914 0.0736 100,000
0.5 wp2 0.0497 0.0309 0.0001 0.1099 0.0497 0.0108 100,000
0.5  rev2 0.0252 0.0341 0.0005 0.0420 0.0253 0.0916 100,000
rev  iqc 0.0111 0.0536 0.0007 0.1157 0.0113 0.0948 100,000
0.5  iqc2 0.0382 0.1186 0.0017 0.1957 0.0388 0.2687 100,000
time 0.0145 0.0053 0.0002 0.0240 0.0149 0.0031 100,000
t  rev 0.0118 0.0041 0.0001 0.0200 0.0118 0.0038 100,000
t  iqc 0.0134 0.0072 0.0001 0.0009 0.0135 0.0271 100,000
t wm 0.0014 0.0009 0.0000 0.0005 0.0014 0.0032 100,000
t wp 0.0001 0.0010 0.0000 0.0017 0.0001 0.0020 100,000
paxh 0.4812 0.0433 0.0013 0.3910 0.4829 0.5614 100,000
0.5  paxh2 0.0836 0.0158 0.0004 0.0503 0.0843 0.1126 100,000
paxh  rev 0.0074 0.0308 0.0007 0.0521 0.0070 0.0688 100,000
paxh  iqc 0.0252 0.0286 0.0004 0.0814 0.0252 0.0308 100,000
paxh wm 0.0021 0.0044 0.0000 0.0066 0.0021 0.0108 100,000
paxh wp 0.0049 0.0045 0.0000 0.0040 0.0049 0.0138 100,000
t  paxh 0.0040 0.0031 0.0000 0.0022 0.0040 0.0102 100,000
psi[lcc] 0.4474 0.1374 0.0037 0.7073 0.4495 0.1669 100,000
psi[cha] 0.3900 0.1640 0.0050 0.0715 0.3883 0.7124 100,000
lambda 3.7230 0.9285 0.0243 2.1570 3.6360 5.7750 100,000
Note: rev: commercial revenues, iqc: capital index, wm: material price, wp: labor price, paxh: hedonically-adjusted passengers.
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Fig. 3. Kernel density graphs for economies of scale (scale) and economies of capacity utilization (ecu) at the average airport.
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470 Manchester’s recognition that Ryanair imposed lower costs on airport operations. If inﬂation is taken into account, the air-
471 port charges that Manchester levied to different airline types are consistent with our estimates, thus providing economic
472 justiﬁcation for the Airport’s price discrimination strategy.
Table 5
Estimated marginal costs and average incremental costs at UK airports (2009).
Airport Scale/ECU Efﬁciency Marginal Cost (GBP) Average incremental cost (GBP)
Full-service Low-cost Charter Full-service Low-cost Charter
Aberdeen Long-run 1.80 0.91 3.18 2.22 4.24 5.74 4.00 7.64
Short-run 1.51 0.87 3.26 2.08 4.82 4.92 3.15 7.27
Belfast Long-run 1.66 0.79 2.66 1.85 3.53 4.42 3.08 5.88
Short-run 1.56 0.86 2.77 1.77 4.09 4.31 2.76 6.37
Birmingham Long-run 1.52 0.86 4.24 2.95 5.64 6.46 4.50 8.60
Short-run 1.28 0.72 3.10 1.98 4.58 3.97 2.54 5.87
Blackpool Long-run 3.22 0.55 5.24 3.65 6.97 16.83 11.73 22.41
Short-run 2.53 0.44 5.47 3.50 8.08 13.87 8.87 20.48
Bournemouth Long-run 2.05 0.98 5.52 3.85 7.35 11.30 7.87 15.04
Short-run 1.92 0.99 5.79 3.70 8.54 11.10 7.10 16.39
Bristol Long-run 1.67 0.90 2.59 1.80 3.44 4.32 3.01 5.75
Short-run 1.41 0.84 2.24 1.44 3.32 3.18 2.03 4.69
Cardiff Long-run 2.05 0.81 2.70 1.88 3.59 5.53 3.86 7.37
Short-run 1.74 0.82 2.76 1.76 4.07 4.81 3.07 7.10
Coventry Long-run 2.89 0.82 15.58 10.85 20.73 44.94 31.30 59.82
Short-run 2.30 0.74 15.91 10.17 23.50 36.62 23.41 54.09
East Midlands Long-run 1.68 0.90 3.85 2.68 5.12 6.48 4.51 8.63
Short-run 1.44 0.91 3.71 2.37 5.48 5.36 3.43 7.92
Edinburgh Long-run 1.53 0.76 3.05 2.12 4.06 4.65 3.24 6.19
Short-run 1.41 0.87 2.93 1.87 4.32 4.12 2.63 6.08
Exeter Long-run 2.19 0.77 7.00 4.87 9.31 15.35 10.70 20.44
Short-run 1.86 0.74 7.36 4.71 10.88 13.70 8.76 20.24
Glasgow Long-run 1.61 0.78 3.01 2.09 4.00 4.84 3.37 6.45
Short-run 1.37 0.69 2.32 1.49 3.43 3.18 2.03 4.69
Humberside Long-run 2.59 0.96 7.92 5.52 10.54 20.54 14.31 27.34
Short-run 2.09 0.96 8.05 5.15 11.89 16.80 10.74 24.81
Leeds Long-run 2.08 0.80 3.68 2.56 4.89 7.65 5.33 10.18
Short-run 1.67 0.79 2.81 1.79 4.14 4.70 3.00 6.94
Liverpool Long-run 1.81 0.67 2.58 1.80 3.43 4.68 3.26 6.23
Short-run 1.50 0.57 1.98 1.27 2.93 2.98 1.90 4.40
London City Long-run 1.68 0.79 4.18 2.91 5.56 7.03 4.90 9.36
Short-run 1.51 0.73 4.27 2.73 6.31 6.43 4.11 9.50
London GW Long-run 1.21 0.73 5.49 3.82 7.30 6.62 4.61 8.81
Short-run 1.09 0.65 4.12 2.64 6.09 4.52 2.89 6.67
London HR Long-run 1.11 0.82 15.49 10.79 20.62 17.12 11.93 22.79
Short-run 0.99 0.70 7.97 5.09 11.76 7.92 5.06 11.70
London Luton Long-run 1.48 0.93 4.77 3.33 6.35 7.05 4.91 9.39
Short-run 1.28 0.87 4.65 2.97 6.87 5.98 3.82 8.83
London STN Long-run 1.37 0.82 4.81 3.35 6.40 6.59 4.59 8.77
Short-run 1.18 0.62 3.41 2.18 5.03 4.00 2.56 5.91
Manchester Long-run 1.28 0.85 5.87 4.09 7.81 7.48 5.21 9.96
Short-run 1.15 0.85 4.77 3.05 7.05 5.50 3.52 8.12
Newcastle Long-run 1.71 0.80 4.31 3.00 5.73 7.37 5.14 9.82
Short-run 1.54 0.80 2.19 1.40 3.23 3.36 2.15 4.96
Shefﬁeld Long-run 2.68 0.67 4.69 3.27 6.24 12.54 8.74 16.69
Short-run 2.10 0.85 3.98 2.55 5.88 8.38 5.36 12.38
Southampton Long-run 2.14 0.79 4.07 2.84 5.42 8.71 6.07 11.60
Short-run 1.75 0.69 4.17 2.67 6.16 7.31 4.68 10.80
Southend Long-run 6.45 0.63 12.79 8.91 17.03 82.52 57.49 109.85
Short-run 4.42 0.57 13.53 8.65 19.98 59.71 38.17 88.20
Teesside Long-run 2.68 0.87 6.07 4.23 8.09 16.25 11.32 21.63
Short-run 2.26 0.90 7.01 4.48 10.35 15.85 10.13 23.41
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473 6. Summary
474 This paper aims to provide empirical evidence in support of increased differentiation in airport charges on the basis of
475 marginal passenger costs being sensitive to the type of airline. To that end, both long- and short-run multi-output cost func-
476 tions are estimated over an unbalanced pool database of 29 UK airports observed between 1995 and 2009. The passenger
477 output is hedonically-adjusted in order to introduce the desired level of disaggregation while keeping a parsimonious
478 speciﬁcation.
479 Results show that low-cost passengers impose signiﬁcantly lower costs to the airport than those from either full-service
480 or charter ﬂights. This is clearly related to the lower infrastructure demands of low-cost operations in terms of aircraft turn-
481 arounds and terminal amenities. From a ﬁnancial perspective, this result would support airlines’ claims for lower airport
482 charges that reﬂect the quality of the available infrastructure. In case no terminal differentiation exists, price discrimination
483 on the basis of usage will equally be justiﬁed. At congested airports, this would lead to optimal usage and valid investment
Fig. 4. Evolution of price caps and estimated long-run marginal and incremental costs at designated airports 2000–2009 (current prices). Note: LR: long-
run, MC: marginal cost, AIC: average incremental cost, fsc: full-service, lcc: low-cost, cha: charter. Source: CAA statistics.
Table 6
Trafﬁc distribution at designated airports 2000–2009. Source: CAA statistics.
2000 (%) 2001 (%) 2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 2006 (%) 2007 (%) 2008 (%) 2009 (%)
Gatwick
slcc 0.5 0.6 1.6 5.1 9.3 10.9 14.1 15.8 17.7 22.5
scha 35.8 34.3 36.2 37.3 34.6 31.6 28.4 27.1 24.0 22.8
Stansted
slcc 29.0 40.3 46.7 49.9 52.1 52.2 48.3 51.8 51.9 51.9
scha 13.1 10.5 8.5 7.4 6.0 5.2 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.4
Manchester
slcc 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 2.8 5.4 9.3 15.6 16.0 19.2
scha 53.6 49.6 50.8 50.7 46.7 43.0 40.2 38.2 36.3 33.9
Note: Heathrow shares of low-cost (slcc) and charter trafﬁc (scha) are negligible (<0.2%).
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484 signals. Besides the UK, these policy conclusions can be very relevant for other countries, e.g. Spain, where the envisaged
485 privatization process will generate a great need for price regulation. On non-designated airports, our results provide eco-
486 nomic justiﬁcation for the price discrimination strategies already implemented in the UK, in which low-cost carriers pay re-
487 duced charges for the use of the infrastructure.
488 Further research should implement the proposed methodology on a much broader database that is able to provide en-
489 ough degrees of freedom to support the speciﬁcation of e.g. airport-speciﬁc hedonic estimates. This would allow for a much
490 deeper investigation of the differences in infrastructure usage of different airline categories. Finally, note that service quality
491 has not been taken into account in this research due to lack of reliable data. Also, our cost function does not take into account
492 externalities or other undesirable outputs of airport operations. Hence, all policy conclusions should be interpreted in purely
493 ﬁnancial terms, which, in any case, will be of major interest for the airport operators, regulators and other stakeholders.
494 7. Uncited references
495 Zhang et al. (2011), Martín and Voltes-Dorta (2011b) and Morrison and Winston (1989).
496 Acknowledgements
497 The authors wish to thank Charles Ng from the UK CAA, Xiaowen Fu from Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and Héctor
498 Rodríguez-Déniz from the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria for their valuable comments and support in the early
499 stages of this research.
500 Appendix A. Model speciﬁcations
501 All variables are logged, except time, and deviated from their sample averages.
502 A.1. Long-run model
503
504
ln TCit ¼ a1 þ a2paxhþ a3rev þ b4xc þ b5xm þ b6xp þ c7paxhxc þ c8paxhxm þ c9paxhxp þ c10revxc þ c11revxm
þ c12revxp þ d130:5xcxc þ d14xcxm þ d15xcxp þ d160:5xmxm þ d17xmxp þ d180:5xpxp þ q190:5paxhpaxh
þ q20paxhrev þ q210:5revrev þ s22t þ s23tpaxhþ s24trev þ s25txc þ s26txm þ s27txp þ uit þ v it506
507
Sm ¼ b4 þ c7paxhþ c10rev þ d13xc þ d14xm þ d15xp þ s25t509
510
Sm ¼ b5 þ c8paxhþ c11rev þ d14xc þ d16xm þ d17xp þ s26t512
513
Sp ¼ b6 þ c9paxhþ c12rev þ d15xc þ d17xm þ d18xp þ s27t515
516
b4 þ b5 þ b6 ¼ 1; c7 þ c8 þ c9 ¼ 0; c10 þ c11 þ c12 ¼ 0; d13 þ d14 þ d15 ¼ 0; d14 þ d16 þ d17 ¼ 0;
d15 þ d17 þ d18 ¼ 0; s25 þ s26 þ s27518
519
paxh ¼ paxþ w1slcc þ w2scha521
522 A.2. Short-run model
523
524
lnVCit ¼ a1 þ a2paxhþ a3rev þu4iqc þ b5xm þ b6xp þ c7paxhxm þ c8paxhxp þ c9revxm þ c10revxp þ c11iqcxm
þ c12iqcxp þ d130:5xmxm þ d14xmxp þ d150:5xpxp þ q160:5paxhpaxhþ q17paxhrev þ q18paxhiqc
þ q190:5revrev þ q20rev iqc þ q210:5iqciqc þ s22t þ s23tpaxhþ s24trev þ s25tiqc þ s26txm þ s27txp þ uit
þ v it526
527
Sm ¼ b5 þ c7paxhþ c9rev þ c11iqc þ d13xm þ d14xp þ s26t529
530
Sp ¼ b6 þ c8paxhþ c10rev þ c12iqc þ d14xm þ d15xp þ s27t532
Q6
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Appendix B. Conﬁdence intervals for scale economies, MC and AIC estimates
Airport Scale/ECU MC (GBP) AIC (GBP)
Full-service Low-cost Charter Full-service Low-cost Charter
2.5%Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5%Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5% Median 95%
Aberdeen Long-run 1.44 1.81 2.40 2.53 3.17 3.85 1.60 2.20 3.00 2.98 4.20 5.84 4.69 5.74 7.20 2.95 4.00 5.47 5.60 7.64 10.63
Short-run 1.22 1.51 2.00 2.67 3.25 3.86 1.54 2.07 2.77 3.47 4.79 6.52 4.03 4.93 6.21 2.34 3.16 4.33 5.35 7.28 10.12
Belfast Long-run 1.34 1.67 2.18 2.05 2.64 3.32 1.44 1.84 2.29 2.42 3.50 5.10 3.44 4.42 5.80 2.50 3.08 3.85 4.07 5.88 8.69
Short-run 1.24 1.56 2.09 2.16 2.76 3.45 1.40 1.76 2.18 2.81 4.06 5.87 3.32 4.32 5.75 2.20 2.76 3.55 4.38 6.37 9.52
Birmingham Long-run 1.15 1.53 2.29 3.21 4.22 5.27 2.07 2.93 4.07 3.88 5.60 7.86 5.17 6.48 8.57 3.32 4.52 6.40 6.27 8.62 12.38
Short-run 0.99 1.29 1.85 2.46 3.09 3.75 1.44 1.97 2.65 3.27 4.55 6.25 3.24 3.98 5.15 1.90 2.55 3.57 4.32 5.87 8.30
Blackpool Long-run 1.53 3.15 17.91 2.07 5.20 8.58 1.40 3.63 6.05 2.63 6.84 12.60 9.01 16.59 56.84 6.27 11.63 38.98 10.75 22.26 79.30
Short-run 1.33 2.51 10.75 2.71 5.45 8.42 1.67 3.49 5.43 3.77 7.97 13.87 8.47 13.79 39.33 5.38 8.84 25.15 11.16 20.51 61.40
Bourne
mouth
Long-run 1.57 2.05 2.97 4.13 5.49 7.08 2.78 3.82 5.00 4.92 7.28 10.61 8.72 11.28 15.24 6.06 7.90 10.54 10.46 15.04 22.47
Short-run 1.48 1.92 2.77 4.43 5.75 7.33 2.73 3.68 4.75 5.86 8.47 12.19 8.58 11.10 14.97 5.47 7.12 9.50 11.45 16.40 24.49
Bristol Long-run 1.30 1.68 2.36 1.99 2.58 3.22 1.33 1.79 2.34 2.36 3.42 4.87 3.43 4.33 5.70 2.34 3.02 3.99 4.10 5.75 8.36
Short-run 1.12 1.42 1.94 1.78 2.23 2.73 1.10 1.43 1.81 2.34 3.29 4.62 2.55 3.19 4.12 1.60 2.03 2.65 3.38 4.69 6.71
Cardiff Long-run 1.59 2.06 2.89 2.02 2.68 3.47 1.31 1.87 2.57 2.53 3.56 4.90 4.26 5.54 7.43 2.81 3.87 5.38 5.48 7.37 10.17
Short-run 1.39 1.75 2.37 2.15 2.74 3.44 1.29 1.75 2.34 2.99 4.05 5.40 3.77 4.81 6.33 2.28 3.08 4.21 5.37 7.11 9.64
Coventry Long-run 1.91 2.90 5.99 9.41 15.47 22.12 6.39 10.81 15.53 11.57 20.43 33.48 29.06 44.73 80.68 19.91 31.43 54.91 34.59 59.76 116.32
Short-run 1.59 2.31 4.19 10.50 15.84 21.67 6.58 10.17 13.93 13.99 23.16 36.58 24.62 36.50 60.93 15.64 23.50 38.29 32.51 53.97 98.78
East
Midlands
Long-run 1.33 1.69 2.31 2.96 3.83 4.80 1.99 2.66 3.48 3.58 5.09 7.10 5.12 6.50 8.50 3.50 4.52 5.96 6.27 8.62 12.21
Short-run 1.16 1.45 1.93 2.95 3.70 4.53 1.82 2.36 3.01 3.94 5.45 7.48 4.29 5.38 6.93 2.69 3.44 4.47 5.82 7.93 11.07
Edinburgh Long-run 1.18 1.53 2.17 2.36 3.03 3.76 1.58 2.11 2.73 2.70 4.02 5.94 3.73 4.66 6.08 2.55 3.25 4.26 4.26 6.21 9.31
Short-run 1.07 1.41 2.08 2.27 2.91 3.61 1.41 1.86 2.40 2.88 4.29 6.30 3.22 4.12 5.57 2.02 2.64 3.60 4.15 6.10 9.43
Exeter Long-run 1.67 2.20 3.25 5.10 6.95 9.17 3.44 4.85 6.43 6.23 9.23 13.36 11.52 15.35 21.31 8.07 10.73 14.49 14.27 20.43 30.37
Short-run 1.44 1.87 2.65 5.56 7.32 9.44 3.48 4.69 6.05 7.52 10.81 15.30 10.43 13.69 18.90 6.69 8.79 11.86 14.22 20.25 29.79
Glasgow Long-run 1.23 1.62 2.35 2.29 2.99 3.74 1.52 2.08 2.77 2.74 3.97 5.64 3.85 4.85 6.42 2.57 3.38 4.60 4.62 6.45 9.36
Short-run 1.07 1.37 1.92 1.85 2.32 2.82 1.12 1.48 1.92 2.43 3.41 4.75 2.56 3.18 4.13 1.57 2.04 2.72 3.41 4.70 6.72
Humberside Long-run 1.78 2.59 4.75 5.24 7.88 11.02 3.34 5.46 8.49 6.78 10.48 14.73 14.45 20.56 32.55 9.11 14.36 24.25 19.61 27.41 41.86
Short-run 1.49 2.09 3.47 5.74 8.01 10.78 3.35 5.10 7.61 8.31 11.85 15.91 12.19 16.83 25.35 7.03 10.78 17.49 18.35 24.85 36.39
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Appendix B (continued)
Airport Scale/ECU MC (GBP) AIC (GBP)
Full-service Low-cost Charter Full-service Low-cost Charter
2.5%Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5%Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5% Median 95% 2.5% Median 95%
Leeds Long-run 1.63 2.09 2.88 2.79 3.65 4.65 1.87 2.55 3.34 3.28 4.85 7.14 5.98 7.65 10.09 4.11 5.34 6.98 6.99 10.20 15.13
Short-run 1.36 1.68 2.19 2.25 2.79 3.41 1.39 1.79 2.24 2.89 4.11 5.89 3.77 4.70 6.00 2.38 3.01 3.84 4.86 6.94 10.06
Liverpool Long-run 1.43 1.82 2.46 1.98 2.57 3.24 1.37 1.79 2.26 2.27 3.40 5.09 3.64 4.68 6.17 2.61 3.26 4.15 4.18 6.23 9.48
Short-run 1.22 1.51 1.95 1.58 1.98 2.43 1.01 1.26 1.55 1.99 2.91 4.27 2.37 2.98 3.85 1.56 1.91 2.38 3.00 4.40 6.60
London
City
Long-run 1.37 1.69 2.18 3.39 4.16 4.95 2.07 2.89 4.02 3.78 5.53 8.01 5.93 7.04 8.49 3.55 4.90 6.82 6.50 9.36 13.56
Short-run 1.23 1.51 1.95 3.54 4.26 4.98 1.97 2.71 3.72 4.34 6.27 9.00 5.38 6.43 7.87 2.99 4.12 5.76 6.61 9.50 13.79
London GW Long-run 0.84 1.21 2.21 4.41 6.35 8.33 2.90 4.40 6.29 5.46 8.40 12.29 5.94 7.69 11.32 3.87 5.39 8.28 7.23 10.26 16.01
Short-run 0.75 1.10 2.05 3.70 5.23 6.84 2.24 3.33 4.71 5.05 7.70 11.15 4.40 5.75 8.73 2.63 3.70 5.83 5.99 8.53 13.60
London HR Long-run 0.72 1.11 2.44 9.76 15.47 21.00 6.34 10.69 16.35 11.80 20.36 32.15 13.11 17.12 27.62 8.11 12.04 20.64 14.97 23.00 40.42
Short-run 0.64 1.00 2.25 5.11 7.95 10.72 3.05 5.05 7.64 6.84 11.63 18.19 5.97 7.91 13.53 3.40 5.11 9.08 7.64 11.81 21.41
London
Luton
Long-run 1.12 1.48 2.19 3.58 4.75 6.03 2.45 3.31 4.28 4.17 6.30 9.43 5.54 7.07 9.44 3.88 4.92 6.53 6.41 9.41 14.32
Short-run 0.99 1.29 1.86 3.60 4.63 5.78 2.26 2.96 3.75 4.61 6.81 10.01 4.75 5.99 7.91 3.05 3.83 5.04 6.09 8.87 13.32
London
STN
Long-run 0.98 1.37 2.32 3.44 4.79 6.27 2.34 3.33 4.46 4.02 6.34 9.74 5.06 6.62 9.38 3.55 4.60 6.54 5.88 8.81 13.99
Short-run 0.86 1.18 1.91 2.53 3.39 4.33 1.59 2.17 2.81 3.28 4.98 7.52 3.12 4.02 5.58 2.01 2.57 3.58 3.99 5.95 9.25
Manchester Long-run 0.91 1.28 2.15 4.19 5.84 7.60 2.73 4.06 5.78 5.25 7.76 10.90 5.81 7.50 10.54 3.76 5.25 7.84 7.32 10.00 14.65
Short-run 0.82 1.15 1.97 3.46 4.76 6.13 2.08 3.03 4.27 4.81 7.01 9.75 4.24 5.52 7.96 2.53 3.54 5.35 5.95 8.16 12.19
Newcastle Long-run 1.35 1.72 2.36 3.33 4.29 5.32 2.18 2.98 3.98 4.03 5.69 7.90 5.88 7.39 9.58 3.89 5.15 6.92 7.22 9.82 13.73
Short-run 1.17 1.54 2.26 1.68 2.18 2.72 1.02 1.39 1.85 2.27 3.21 4.43 2.56 3.36 4.64 1.57 2.16 3.08 3.53 4.97 7.30
Shefﬁeld Long-run 1.80 2.67 5.15 3.02 4.66 6.52 2.01 3.24 4.74 3.81 6.18 9.32 9.01 12.55 20.10 5.99 8.80 13.86 11.32 16.71 27.45
Short-run 1.48 2.10 3.61 2.84 3.96 5.27 1.73 2.53 3.50 3.95 5.84 8.38 6.25 8.39 12.60 3.84 5.39 7.99 8.70 12.41 19.33
South
ampton
Long-run 1.66 2.15 3.07 3.02 4.05 5.32 2.09 2.83 3.60 3.50 5.37 8.20 6.54 8.69 12.06 4.81 6.08 7.84 7.60 11.60 18.38
Short-run 1.37 1.76 2.47 3.18 4.15 5.35 2.06 2.66 3.28 4.07 6.12 9.23 5.52 7.31 10.14 3.72 4.68 6.12 7.08 10.82 16.96
Southend Long-run 0.00 4.37 66.29 0.00 12.61 30.20 0.00 8.72 21.90 0.00 17.00 38.69 0.00 62.79 578.4 0.00 43.93 401.1 0.00 84.84 781.9
Short-run 0.00 3.66 43.45 0.33 13.33 27.98 0.21 8.47 18.60 0.44 19.94 39.51 0.00 51.87 358.3 0.00 33.41 225.9 0.00 77.61 531.7
Teesside Long-run 1.71 2.67 6.04 3.73 6.05 8.51 2.47 4.19 6.32 4.69 8.00 12.41 11.57 16.22 28.66 7.59 11.42 20.02 14.31 21.70 39.61
Short-run 1.48 2.26 4.68 4.69 6.98 9.43 2.85 4.44 6.44 6.50 10.26 15.31 11.60 15.84 26.42 6.99 10.22 17.17 15.83 23.51 40.82
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b5 þ b6 ¼ 1; c7 þ c8 ¼ 0; c9 þ c10 ¼ 0; c11 þ c12 ¼ 0; d13 þ d14 ¼ 0; d14 þ d15 ¼ 0; s26 þ s27 ¼ 0539
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